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Introduction
The European Monetary Union(EMU) crisis has sent a strong signal to other common currency regions on the goals of real and monetary policy convergence. A major lesson of the EMU crisis is that serious disequilibria result from regional monetary arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks (Willet, 2010; Willett & Srisorn, 2011) . In designing the euro zone, institutions' almost exclusive concern was placed on limiting crises caused by financial sectors. The official position of the German government today appears to remain that failure of these safeguards is the predominant cause of the crisis. This position can be reasonably argued for Greece, although its loss of competitiveness has also been a major cause for worry.
In this paper we examine the nature of real and monetary policy convergence within the CFA zone. The work contributes to the discussion of financial integration in common currency unions. By dissecting elements of macroeconomic and monetary policies into financial intermediary dynamics (of depth, efficiency, activity and size), inflation and economic performance, we provide an in depth picture of real and monetary convergence analysis within the CEMAC, UEMOA and CFA zones. In a bid to provide more significant policy implications, we also calculate the speed of convergence and the time needed for full convergence.
Beside the premise of the EMU crisis, the absence of studies that focus on financial convergence in the African continent constitute another motivation for this work. Although a number of papers have investigated the dynamic co-movements of financial markets worldwide, the emphasis has often been on developed markets and the emerging economies of Latin America and Asia. According to Alagidede(2008) , such neglect is far from surprising as African financial markets are viewed as too risky and less developed in operating institutional environments. Economic instability and political strife have plagued many The rest of the paper is structured in the following manner. Section 2 outlines the motivations for assessing convergence within the CFA zone. Section 3 presents data and discusses the methodology. Empirical analysis, discussion and policy implications are covered by Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Motivations for financial system convergence
Financial and economic integration in the CFA zone is expected to provide gains in growth by favoring a breeding atmosphere for competition and efficiency in the banking sector. These gains emanate from price reductions in financial services leading to direct gains for consumers and indirect benefits through the reduction of loaning rate that favor investment (Weill,2009) . Investigating financial intermediary convergence is therefore relevant in the African continent. More so, financial integration and convergence are crucial in assessing the outcome of deregulation policies aimed at improving the performance and efficiency of the financial intermediary sector (Casu & Girardone, 2010) .
Financial theory deems integrated markets to be relatively more efficient in comparison to divergent ones. An integrated financial intermediary market improves crossborder flow of funds, stimulates trading volume which in-turn improves stock market liquidity. Integrated banking markets provide investors with the opportunity to efficiently allocate capital to economic operators (Chen et al., 2002) . The resulting effect is lower cost of capital for firms and lower transaction costs for investors (Kim et al.,2005 ). An integrated banking market has the positive rewards to financial stability as it diminishes the probability of asymmetric shocks (Umutlu et al., 2010) . Financial intermediation stability in-turn could mitigate the risk of cross-border financial contagion (Beine et al.,2010) and improve the capacity of economies to absorb shocks (Yu et al., 2010) .
The financial system exerts a significant influence on modern economic literature debates (Scholtens & Naaborg, 2005) . Firstly, the monetary policy transmission mechanism's effectiveness is contingent on the financial system (Bondt,2000) . Secondly, it is believed to impact channels via which financial development is linked to economic growth (Allen & Gale, 2000) . The financial system interacts with the economy by producing information ex-ante about possible investments, monitoring of investments, allocation of capital, facilitating trade, diversifying and managing risks, mobilizing and pooling savings as well as easing the exchange of goods and services (Levine, 2004) .
The need for convergence in the banking sector of the CFA zone draws on the tenets of arbitrage and the hypothesis proffered by the portfolio theory to devise a framework that inspires convergence in financial markets. The motivations for convergence in banking markets has premises on the literature of financial intermediary sector interdependence and portfolio diversification ( Grubel,1968; Levy & Sarnat, 1970) . These papers have for the most part considered short-term links of stock markets and have found the existence of short-term financial market co-movements. These results have been extended to cover co-variations of financial markets over the long-run (Bessler & Yang, 2003) . Majority of these papers have shown evidence of cointegration as well as short-term links which depict some form of convergence in financial markets.
Dynamics of financial intermediation therefore converge to reflect the level of arbitrage activity. When they converge, it means there is a common force such as arbitrage activity that brings the markets together. This implies that convergence in markets will reduce the potential for making above normal profits through international diversification(Von Furstenberg & Jeon, 1989) . By the same token, if deterrents or potential barriers generating country risks and exchange rate premiums are absent, the consequence is similar yields for financial assets of similar risk and liquidity regardless of locality and nationality (Von Furstenberg & Jeon, 1989) .
Within the framework of this paper, real and monetary policy convergence implies the integration of banking sector dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size; as well as inflation and GDP growth.
Data and methodology

Data
We examine a sample of 11 Central and West African countries with data from African Development Indicators(ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database(FDSD) of the World Bank. While openness, inflation, population growth, public investment and GDP growth indicators are obtained from the former source, financial intermediary dynamics are fetched from the later. Owing to constraints in data availability, dataset spans from 1981 to 2009. More information on summary statistics(Appendix 1), correlation analysis(Appendix 2), variable definitions(Appendix 3) and presentation of countries(Appendix 4) is available in the appendices. Concurring with Narayan et al.(2011) it is unlikely to find convergence within a very heterogeneous set of countries. Thus, we disaggregate the CFA zone into two homogenous panels based on regions(CEMAC and UEMOA). The choice of variables is premised on two facts: (1) real economic sector policies are designed to achieve macroeconomic performance through growth in GDP; (2) monetary policies are designed to keep inflation in check and improve financial intermediary dynamics of depth(money supply and liquid liabilities), efficiency(at banking and financial levels), activity(from banking and financial perspectives) and size. For clarity in presentation, selected variables are classified into the following strands.
Financial variables a) Financial depth
Borrowing from recent finance literature (Asongu, 2011abcd) and the FDSD, we measure financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system perspectives with indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. The former represents the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits while the later denotes liquid liabilities. The basis for distinguishing these aspects of financial depth is that we are dealing exclusively with developing countries, where-in a significant chunk of the monetary base does not transit through the banking sector (Asongu, 2011e) . Both measures are in ratios of GDP(see Appendix 3) and can robustly cross-check one another as either account for over 89% of variability in the other(see Appendix 2).
b) Financial efficiency
Financial intermediation efficiency here neither refers to the production efficiency of decision making units nor to the profitability-oriented concept in the banking industry. What this paper elicits is the ability of banks to effectively meet their fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators. We therefore employ proxies for banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency (respectively 'bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd' and 'financial system credit on financial system deposits:
Fcfd'). Like with financial depth, these two intermediation efficiency proxies can cross-check each other as either represent more than 92% of variability in the other (see Appendix 2).
c) Financial size
In line with the FDSD we measure financial intermediary size as the ratio of "deposit bank assets" to the "total assets" (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets: Dbacba).
d) Financial activity
The concept of financial intermediary activity here highlights the ability of banks to grant credit to economic operators. In a bid for robustness we proxy for both banking intermediary activity and financial intermediary activity with "private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb" and "private credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions:
Pcrbof" respectively. The later measure cross-checks the former as it accounts for more than 99% of information in the former (see Appendix 2).
Other variables
In accordance with the convergence literature we also measure the outcome of monetary policy with inflation (Bruno et al.,2011) , account for macro economic performance with GDP growth rate and control for openness, public investment and population growth in the regressions (Pritchett, 1997; Bruno et al.,2011; Narayan et al., 2011) . In the literature on convergence of per capita incomes and the root of the convergence theory, the premise is that per capita incomes of countries identical in structural characteristics such as preferences in technologies, rate of population growth and government policies have the tendency to converge to one another if the countries share similar fundamental characteristics (Prichett, 1997) . In determining these structural characteristics in our analysis, we proxy for preferences in technology, population growth and government policy with openness(trade), population growth rate and public investment respectively. As concerns common fundamental characteristics, we assume countries share similar monetary and real policies owing to common central banks.
Methodology
According to Fung(2009; 3) the two equations below are the standard approaches in the literature for investigating conditional convergence if t i W , is taken as strictly exogenous.
Where σ = 1+ β, 
Even with this individual fixed effect elimination, estimation by Ordinary Least Square(OLS) is still biased because there remains a correlation between the lagged endogenous independent variable and the disturbance term. Arellano & Bond(1991) proposed an application of the Generalized Method of Moments(GMM) that exploits all the orthogonality conditions between the dependent lagged variables and the error term. This GMM approach has been extensively used in the convergence literature and recently applied by Narayan et al.(2011) . While Narayan et al.(2011) use Eq.(1) without fixed effects, this paper applies Eq.(3) instead; as defined by Fung(2009) . We prefer the second-step GMM because it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity. In the first-step the residuals are considered to be homoscedastic. The hypothesis of no auto-correlation in residuals is crucial as past lagged variables are to be used as instruments for the dependent variables. Also the estimation depends on the assumption that the lagged values of the outcome variable and other explaining variables are valid instruments in the regression. When the error terms of the level equation are not auto-correlated, the first-order auto-correlation of the differenced residuals should be significant while their second-order auto-correlation should not be the case. The validity of the instruments is investigated by virtue of the Sargan over-identifying restrictions test(OIR).
As emphasized by Islam (1995; 14) , annual time spans are too short to be convenient for studying convergence, as short run disturbances may loom substantially in such brief time spans. Therefore with respect to our data span of 28 years, we borrow from Narayan et al.(2011) in using a 4 year non-overlapping interval such that we have seven time intervals: 1982-1985; 1986-1989 and so on. This implies in the analysis, the autoregressive order τ is set to 4.
We also compute the implied rate of convergence by calculating (σ/4) which by virtue of Eqs. (1) and (2) is the equivalent of the Narayan et al. (2011) computation with (1+β)/4.
Thus the paper divides the estimated coefficient of the lagged differenced endogenous variable by 4 because we have used a four year non overlapping span in a bid to absorb short term disturbances. When the absolute value of the estimated autoregressive coefficient is greater than zero but less than one( 1 0    ), we conclude the presence of convergence. A broader interpretation suggests, past differences have a less proportionate impact on future differences, meaning the variation on the left hand side of Eq. (3) is diminishing overtime as the country is converging to a stable state.
Empirical analysis
This section addresses three main issues: (1) assessment of the presence of convergence ; (2) determination of the speed of convergence and; (3) computation of the time needed for full(100%) convergence. Table 1 presents a summary of overall findings and addresses the first two issues, while Table 2 and Table 3 that the instruments as a group are strictly exogenous(do not suffer from endogeneity), which is needed for the validity of the GMM estimates. We also report the Wald statistics for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. The autocorrelation, Sargan and Wald tests statistics with associated p-values for each of the panels are reported in the tables. The Sargan test statistics often appear with a p-value greater than 0.10, hence its null hypothesis is not rejected for the most part. We only report the AR(2) test in first difference because it is more important than AR(1) as it detects autocorrelation in levels. For most estimated models we are unable to reject the AR(2) null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. There is therefore robust evidence that most of the models are free from autocorrelation at the 1% significance level.
Synthesis of results
In Table 1 , we provide a summary of our results. This summary results is based on details presented in Tables 2-3 Convergence respectively. We notice that for the three panels, with respect to all dynamics only financial size within the CFA zone reflects a conditional convergence. There is no form of convergence within the CEMAC zone. The UEMOA and CFA zones both reflect absolute convergence in liquid liabilities, banking activity, financial activity and financial size. There is the absence of any form of convergence within any zone for inflation and GDP growth regressions. On a specific note, we observe absolute convergence within the UEMOA(CFA zone) in money supply(banking and financial efficiency). we notice that for all models, the instruments are valid as the null hypotheses of the AR (2) and Sargan OIR tests are not rejected. Where the lagged endogenous estimated coefficient is significant, the Wald statistics is also significant. We expected this result for the Wald statistic because only one endogenous regressor is used in the absolute convergence regressions. For financial depth, with respect to money supply we notice convergence only within the UEMOA zone (at a 5% significance level) with a speed of 7.78% per annum(p.a). This implies that a 100% convergence will be achieved in about 51.41 years(yrs). With regard to the liquid liability dimension of financial depth, there is evidence of convergence within the UEMOA and CFA zones at a 10% significance level, with speeds(time) of(for full) convergence: 10.82% p.a (36.96 yrs) and 7.5% p.a (53.33 yrs) respectively.
Results of absolute convergence
Looking at results for financial efficiency, only those of the CFA zone are significant at the 1% level from both banking and financial system perspectives. Banking(financial) system efficiency has a convergence rate of 12.32% (14.72%) p.a and a 100% convergence time of 32.46(27.17) years.
We also notice evidence of AC in banking(financial) system activity within the UEMOA and CFA zones at a 1% significance level. For UEMOA, the speeds(time) of(for full) convergence in banking and financial system activity are(is) equal at(in) 11.02% p.a (36.29 yrs). With regard to the CFA zone the speeds(time) of(for full) convergence in banking and financial system activity are respectively 12.67% p.a (31.57yrs) and 12.75% p.a (31.37yrs).
In the convergence analysis of financial size we also find evidence of AC within the UEMOA and CFA zones at a 5 % significance level with speeds(time) of(for full) convergence: 16.75% p.a (23.88yrs) and 7.2% p.a (55.55yrs) respectively.
We find no support for convergence in inflation and GDP growth. The highest and lowest rates of AC are found in the financial size analysis. While the highest rate of AC convergence is within UEMOA (23.88yrs at a convergence rate of 16.75% p.a), the lowest rate is within the CFA zone(55.55 yrs at a convergence rate of 7.2% p.a). Table 3 below reports results of conditional convergence. First and foremost, we notice that but for the CFA zone(in financial system efficiency and financial size: with respect to AR(2) at a 10% level) in all models the instruments are valid at 5% and 1% significance levels as the null hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan OIR tests are not rejected. Of all combinations of panels with elements of real and monetary policy, we find the presence of conditional convergence only in financial size within the CFA zone with a speed of 18.62% p.a and a time for 100% convergence of 21.48 years. 
Results of conditional convergence
Discussion and policy implications
Before we delve into the discussion of results, it is important at the outset to understand the economic intuition motivating absolute and conditional convergence in real and monetary policies within the Franc CFA zone. The European Monetary Union(EMU) crisis has sent a strong signal to other common currency regions on the goals of real and monetary convergence. A major lesson of the EMU crisis is that serious disequilibria result from regional monetary arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks (Willet, 2010; Willett & Srisorn, 2011) . In designing the euro zone, institutions' almost exclusive concern was placed on limiting crises caused by financial sectors. The official position of the German government today appears to maintain that failure of these safeguards is the predominant cause of the crisis. The present analysis has been based on two hypotheses: (1) real economic sector policies are designed to achieve macroeconomic performance through growth in GDP; (2) monetary policies are designed to keep inflation in check and improve financial intermediary dynamics of depth(money supply and liquid liabilities), efficiency(at banking and financial levels), activity(from banking and financial perspectives) and size.
Absolute convergence
Absolute convergence is the result from factors such as monetary unions and the adoption of a single currency, among others (Nayaran et al., 2011) . Absolute convergence in real and monetary policy implies countries share the same fundamental characteristics with respect to the financial intermediary market(or monetary policy) such that the only difference across countries is in initial levels of financial intermediary market development. In the CFA zone, the CEMAC and UEMOA regions that constitute it have distinct central banks which have independent monetary policies. This explains the large disparity in significance between their absolute and conditional convergence estimates. 
Conditional convergence
According to the economic growth literature (Barro, 1991) , conditional convergence depicts convergence whereby one's own long-term steady state(equilibrium) is contingent on the different structural characteristics or fundamentals of each economy or market (Nayaran et al.,2011) . Borrowing from Narayan et al.(2011) still, when financial intermediary markets across countries differ in terms of factors relating to the performance of their markets, there could be conditional convergence. The convergence in dynamics of the banking sector is contingent on variables which we observe and empirically test. Our results are thus conditional on the macroeconomic variables we have used. Note should be taken of the fact that, owing to constraints in data availability and degrees of freedom required for the OIR test, we conditioned our analysis on three macroeconomic variables : consistent with the convergence literature (Prichett,1997; Bruno et al.,2011; Narayan et al., 2011) . But for the case of financial size within the CFA zone, our results do not find convergence in other dimensions of monetary and real policy for the UEMOA and CEMAC zones. It follows that small-sized financial intermediary countries within the CFA zone are catching up with the large financial sized markets. If evidence is considered based on both absolute and conditional convergence, then we find strong backing for convergence only in financial size within the CFA zone. This broadly confirms the position of Benassy-Quere & Coupet (2005) that CEMAC and UEMOA countries do not share macroeconomic similarities and hence the CFA zone cannot be viewed as an optimal currency area.
Policy implications
In spite of homogenous monetary policies for countries in the CEMAC, UEMOA and CFA zones, we have only found strong evidence of some unconditional convergence. The absence of evidence for this form of convergence(AC) in certain dynamics could be understood from dissimilar initial conditions of financial development(among member states) and poor implementation of monetary policies(by member states). But for financial size in the CFA zone analysis, similar fundamental characteristics(policies) in member states exhibited for unconditional convergence fail to play, in fine-tuning conditional convergence. It follows that despite homogenous fundamental conditions, structural characteristics and institutional differences (including varying levels of democracy, political strife and quality of government) are playing a crucial role in deterring convergence in real and monetary policies.
As a policy implication monetary policies which are often homogenous for all member states are thwarted by heterogeneous structural and institutional characteristics which give rise to different levels and patterns of financial intermediary development. Therefore member states should work towards harmonizing cross-country differences in structural and institutional characteristics that hamper the effectiveness of monetary policies.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to assess convergence within the CFA zone. It is motivated by major lessons from the EMU crisis which suggest that the serious disequilibria among EMU member states has resulted from regional monetary arrangements not designed to be robust to a variety of shocks. In the investigations we have distinguished the CEMAC from the UEMOA region, before assessing their combined effect in the CFA zone. In the examinations we have assumed monetary policy targets inflation and financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size, while real sector policy targets economic performance in terms of GDP growth. We have also provided the speed(time) of(for full) convergence.
From the findings we notice that for the three panels(with respect all dynamics) only financial size within the CFA zone reflects conditional convergence. There is no form of convergence within the CEMAC zone. The UEMOA and CFA zones both reflect absolute convergence in liquid liabilities, banking activity, financial activity and financial size. There is absence of any form of convergence within any zone for inflation and GDP growth. On a specific note, we observe absolute convergence within the UEMOA(CFA zone) for money supply( banking and financial efficiency).
As a policy implication monetary policies which are often homogenous for all member states are thwarted by heterogeneous structural and institutional characteristics which give rise to different levels and patterns of financial intermediary development. Therefore member states should work towards harmonizing cross-country differences in structural and institutional characteristics that hamper the effectiveness of monetary policies. 
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